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Abstract
I try to give mathematical evidence to the following equivalence, which
is based on ideas from Plato (Timaeus): reality emerges from a more
primitive, non-geometrical, reality in the same way as the brain construct
(understands, simulates, transforms, encodes or decodes) the image of
reality, starting from intensive properties (like a bunch of spiking signals
sent by receptors in the retina), without any use of extensive (i.e. spatial
or geometric) properties.
1 Main statement
I shall try to give support to a statement based on the following citation from
Timaeus, by Plato [1]. Further this will be called Plato hypothesis (or PH):
(PH) ”The sight in my opinion is the source of the greatest benefit to us, for
had we never seen the stars, and the sun, and the heaven, none of the words
which we have spoken about the universe would ever have been uttered. But
now the sight of day and night, and the months and the revolutions of the years,
have created number, and have given us a conception of time, and the power
of enquiring about the nature of the universe; and from this source we have
derived philosophy, than which no greater good ever was or will be given by the
gods to mortal man.”
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Statement. Under Plato’s hypothesis, it follows that:
(A) reality emerges from a more primitive, non-geometrical, reality
in the same way as
(B) the brain construct (understands, simulates, transforms, encodes or de-
codes) the image of reality, starting from intensive properties (like a bunch
of spiking signals sent by receptors in the retina), without any use of ex-
tensive (i.e. spatial or geometric) properties.
The problem (B) is known in life sciences as the problem of ”local sign” [21]
[22]. Indeed, any use of extensive properties would lead to the ”homunculus
fallacy” [5].
These equivalent problems are difficult and wonderfully simple:
- we don’t know how to solve completely problem (A) (in physics) or prob-
lem (B) (in neuroscience),
- but our ventral/dorsal streams and cerebellum do this all the time in about
150 ms. Moreover, any fly does it, as witnessed by its spectacular flight
capacities [20].
The main argument in favor of (PH) comes from the fact that our knowledge
in physics is rooted on the mathematical theories of calculus (Newton, Leibniz)
and differential geometry (Riemann), which appeared from a need to understand
our physical world. Or, in section 3 is explained that maybe the (mathematical
formalism of the) differential calculus and differential geometry could be based
on the way the brain works (or biased by the way the brain works), specifically
on the fact that we have binocular vision.
The backbone of the argument is that, as boolean logic is based on a prim-
itive gate (like NAND), differential calculus and differrential geometry are also
based on a primitive gate (a dilation gate), appearing naturally from the least
sophisticated strategy of exploration which a binocular creature might have,
namely jumping randomly from a place to another, orienting herself by com-
paring what she sees with her two eyes.
2 Orwellian, stalinesque or multiple drafts
Is the reality discrete or continuous? This physics question, related to problem
(A), translates into the realm of problem (B) into the question: is the perceived
reality discrete or continuous? Neuroscience has several intriguing answers to
this. These answers can be then translated back into the language of problem
(A). Let us see what we get in this way.
Discrete sequences of events are perceived as continuous, as in the ”beta
illusion” [2], the more interesting ”phi illlusion” [4] or the ”cutaneous rabbit
illusion” [3]. How is this possible? There are several theories explaining such
illusions, nicely categorized by Daniel Dennet (also proposing his own theory of
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”multiple drafts” [15]). From the description given at [17], such theories can be
characterized as:
(a) orwellian - ”the subject comes to one conclusion, then goes back and
changes that memory in light of subsequent events. This is akin to George
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, where records of the past are routinely
altered.”
(b) stalinesque - the ”events would be reconciled prior to entering the subject’s
consciousness, with the final result presented as fully resolved. This is
akin to Joseph Stalin’s show trials, where the verdict has been decided in
advance and the trial is just a rote presentation.”
(c) multiple drafts - ”there are a variety of sensory inputs from a given event
and also a variety of interpretations of these inputs”. From [16] [there is]
”no central experiencer [who] confers a durable stamp of approval on any
particular draft”.
Translated into the physics realm, this gives several interesting interpretations.
(a) Such a path has been pursued in physics, by Everett’s Many-Worlds In-
terpretation of Quantum Mechanics [19]. More precisely, concerning interpreta-
tions of the collapsing of the wave function which are compatible with Everett
theory, see Deutsch [18] and Stapp [24].
(b) In more general terms, not related especially to the problem of the discrete
versus continuous nature of reality, we can see any theory based on extremality
of an action like being of this type. However, probably due to my ignorance, I
am not aware of physical theories supposing that a discrete reality conspires to
give (to any observer) the appearance of being continuous. More precisely, such
a theory would take as starting point a discrete reality where discrete things
happen, in the limit when the graininess goes to zero, like in a continuous
reality. One big and fundamental difficulty would be then to give a reasonable
mechanism of how is this possible.
(c) This could be seen in physics as if there is a ”stack” of realities, one for
every scale, say reality(ε) at scale ε > 0, with the following property: if we
take reality(ε) and explore it at scale µ > 0, then we get reality(ε)(µ), which
is indiscernible from reality(εµ).
3 The metaphor of the binocular explorer
I shall discuss about the simplest strategy to explore a spaceX (say ”a reality”).
It may be useful to think about this in terms of distance and distance-preserving
maps.
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Preliminaries. Indeed, let us say that we are interested to know if a set X
is discrete or continuous. For this we send an explorer (call her Alice) to look
around. I shall suppose that we can put a distance on this set, that is a function
d : X ×X → [0,+∞) which satisfies the following requirement: we can make
a map of any three points in X , in the sense that for any points x, y, z ∈ X
there is a bijective correspondence with a triple A,B,C in the plane such that
the sizes (lengths) of AB, BC, AC are equal respectively with d(x, y), d(y, z),
d(z, x). Basically, we accept that we can represent in the plane any three points
from the space X .
The explorer (call her Alice) wants to make a map of a newly discovered
land X on the piece of paper Y – or by using the mound of clay Y , or even by
carefully recording in her collective mind the echos of her exploratory cries, if
she were a mutant army of bats. ”Understanding” the space X (with respect to
the choice of the ”gauge” function d) into the terms of the more familiar space
Y (itself endowed with a distance function D) means making a map of X into
Y which is not deforming distances too much. Ideally, a perfect map has to be
Lipschitz, that is the distances between points in X are transformed by the map
into distances between points in Y , with a precision independent of the scale:
the map f : X → Y is (bi)Lipschitz if there are positive numbers c < C such
that for any two points x, y ∈ X
cd(x, y) ≤ D(f(x), f(y)) ≤ C d(x, y)
This would be a very good map, because it would tell how X is at all scales.
Only that it is impossible to make such a map in practice. What we can do
instead, is to sample the space X (take a ε-dense subset of X with respect to
the distance d) and try to represent as good as possible this subspace in Y .
Mathematically this is like asking for the map function f to have the following
property: there are supplementary positive constants a,A such that for any two
points x, y ∈ X
cd(x, y)− a ≤ D(f(x), f(y)) ≤ C d(x, y) +A
The problem with these maps is that, only by using one of them, we cannot
decide if the space X is discrete or continuous, because all small details are
erased. There is hope though to get an answer to our question by using an
”atlas” made by lots of such charts, such that for any ε > 0, there is a map
with the constants a/c,A/C smaller than ε. Then, by a passage to the limit (in
itself not at all clear), we should be able to probe the structure of X at smaller
and smaller scales.
But is it possible that such an atlas exist, in the eventuality that the space
Y is not the same as space X? Mathematical results shows that not always!
This seems to be an issue that physicists ignore.
The explorer’s program. Let us go into details of the following exploration
program of the space X : the explorer Alice jumps randomly in the metric space
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(X, d), making drafts of maps at scale ε and simultaneously orienting herself by
using these draft maps.
I shall explain each part of this exploration problem.
Making maps at scale ε. I shall suppose that Alice, while at x ∈ X , makes a
map at scale ε of a neighbourhood of x, called Vε(x), into another neighbourhood
of x, called Uε(x). The map is a function:
δxε : Uε(x)→ Vε(x)
The ”distance on the map” is just:
dxε (u, v) =
1
ε
d(δxεu , δ
x
ε v) (3.0.1)
so the map δxε is indeed a rescaling map, with scale ε.
The choice of making maps of X into X is natural, because we may argue
that the map of the reality is itself a part of the reality.
We suppose of course that the map δxε is a bijection and we call the inverse
of it by the name δxε−1 .
We may suppose that the map of Alice, while being at point x, is a piece of
paper laying down on the ground, centered such that the ”x” on paper coincides
with the place in X marked by ”x”. In mathematical terms, I ask that
δxεx = x (3.0.2)
Jumping randomly in the space X. For random walks we need random
walk kernels, therefore we shall suppose that metric balls in (X, d) have finite,
non zero, (Hausdorff) measure. Let µ be the associated Hausdorff measure.
The ε-random walk is then random jumping from x into the ball B(x, ε), so the
random walk kernel is
mεx =
1
µ(B(x, ε))
µ|B(x,ε) (3.0.3)
but any Borel probability mεx ∈ P(X) would be good.
Compatibility considerations. At his point I want to add some relations
which give a more precise meaning to the scale ε.
I shall first introduce a standard notation. If f : X1 → X2 is a Borel map
and µ ∈ P(X1) is a probability measure in the space X1 then the push-forward
of µ through f is the probability measure f♯µ ∈ P(X2 defined by: for any
B ∈ B(X2)
(f♯µ) (B) = µ(f−1(B))
For example, notice that the random walk kernel is transported into a ran-
dom walk kernel by the inverse of the map δxε−1 . I shall impose that for any
(open) set A ⊂ Uε(x) we have
mεx(δ
x
ε (A)) = mx(A) +O(ε) (3.0.4)
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where O(ε) is a function (independent on x and A) going to zero as ε is going
to zero and mx is a random walk kernel of the map representation (Uε(x), d
x
ε ),
more precisely this is a Borel probability. With the previously induced notation,
relation (3.0.4) appears as:
δxε−1 ♯m
ε
x (A) = mx(A) +O(ε)
Another condition to be imposed is that Vε is approximately the ball B(x, ε),
in the following sense:
mx(Uε(x) \ δ
x
ε−1B(x, ε)) = O(ε) (3.0.5)
Multiple drafts reality. Wemay see the atlas that Alice draws as a ”multiple
drafts” theory of (X, d). Indeed, the reality at scale ε (and centered at x ∈ X),
according to Alice’s exploration, can be seen as the triple:
(Uε(x), d
x
ε , δ
x
ε−1 ♯m
ε
x)
Moreover, we may think that the data used to construct Alice’s atlas are: the
distance d and for any x ∈ X and ε > 0, the functions δxε and the probability
measures mεx.
For any x ∈ X and ε > 0 these data may be transported to the ”reality at
scale ε, centered at x ∈ X”. Indeed, transporting all the data by the function
δxε , we get d
x
ε instead of d, and for any u ∈ X (sufficiently close to x w.r.t. the
distance d) and any µ > 0, we define the relative map making functions:
δx,uε,µ = δ
x
ε−1 δ
δxεu
µ δ
x
ε (3.0.6)
and the relative kernels of random walks:
mε,µx,u = δ
x
ε−1 ♯m
µ
u (3.0.7)
With these data I define reality(x, ε) as:
reality(x, ε) =
(
x, ε, dxε , (u, µ) 7→
(
δx,uε,µ ,m
ε,µ
x,u
))
(3.0.8)
Remark that now we may repeat this construction and define reality(x, ε)(y, µ),
and so on. A sufficient condition for having a ”multiple drafts” like reality:
reality(x, ε)(x, µ) = reality(x, εµ)
is to suppose that for any x ∈ X and any ε, µ > 0 we have
δxε δ
x
µ = δ
x
εµ (3.0.9)
For more discussion about this (but without considering random walk kernels)
see section 2.3 [7] and references therein about the notion of ”metric profiles”.
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Binocular orientation. Here I explain how Alice orients herself by using the
draft maps from her atlas. Remember that Alice jumps from x to δxεu (the point
u on her map centered at x). Once arrived at δxεu, Alice draws another map and
then she uses a binocular approach to understand what she sees from her new
location. She compares the maps simultaneously. Each map is like a telescope,
a microscope, or an eye. Alice has two eyes. With one she sees reality(x, ε) and,
with the other, reality(δxεu, ε). These two ”retinal images” are compatible in a
very specific sense, which gives to Alice the sense of her movements. Namely
Alice uses the following mathematical fact, which was explained before several
times, in the language of: ”dilatation structures” [6] [8], ”metric spaces with
dilations” [7] (but not using groupoids), ”emergent algebras” [9] (showing that
the distance is not necessary for having the result, and also not using groupoids),
[12] (using normed groupoids).
Theorem 3.1 There is a groupoid (a small category with invertible arrows)
Tr(X, ε) which has as objects reality(x, ε), defined at (3.0.8), for all x ∈ X,
and as arrows the functions:
Σxε (u, ·) : reality(δ
x
εu, ε)→ reality(x, ε) (3.0.10)
defined for any u, v ∈ Uε(x) by:
Σxε (u, v) = δ
x
ε−1 δ
δxεu
ε v (3.0.11)
Moreover, all arrows are isomorphisms (they are isometries and transport in the
right way the structures defined at (3.0.6) and (3.0.7), from the source of the
arrrow to the target of it).
Therefore Alice, by comparing the maps she has, orients herself by using
the ”approximate translation by u” Σxε (u, ·) (3.0.11), which appears as an iso-
morphism between the two realities, cf. (3.0.10). This function deserves the
name ”approximate translation”, as proved elsewhere [6] [8] [9], because of the
following reason: if we suppose that reality(x, ε) converges as the scale ε goes
to 0, then Σxε (u, ·) should converge to the translation by u, as seen in the tan-
gent space as x. Namely we have the following mathematical definition and
theorem (for the proof see the cited references; the only new thing concerns the
convergence of the random walk kernel, but this is an easy consequence of the
compatibility conditions (3.0.4) (3.0.5)).
Definition 3.2 A metric space with dilations and random walk (or dilatation
structure with a random walk) is a structure (X, d, δ,m) such that:
(a) (X, d, δ) is a normed uniform idempotent right quasigroup (or dilatation
structure), cf. [11] Definition 7.1.
(b) m is a random walk kernel, that is for every ε > 0 we have a measur-
able function x ∈ X 7→ mεx ∈ P(X) (a transversal function on the pair
groupoid X×X, in the sense of [14] p. 35) which satisfies the compatibility
conditions (3.0.4) (3.0.5).
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Theorem 3.3 Let (X, d, δ,m) be a dilatation structure with a random walk.
Then for any x ∈ X, as the scale ε goes to 0 the structure reality(x, ε) converges
to reality(x, 0) defined by:
reality(x, 0) =
(
x, 0, dx, (u, µ) 7→
(
δx,uµ ,m
µ
x,u
))
(3.0.12)
in the sense that dxε converges uniformly to d
x, dilations δx,uε,µ converge uniformly
to dilations δx,uµ , probabilities m
ε,µ
x,u converge simply to probabilities m
µ
x,u. Finally
Σxε (·, ·) converges uniformly to a conical group operation.
Conical groups are a (noncommutative and vast) generalization of real vector
spaces. See for this [8].
Alice knows the differential geometry of X. All is hidden in dilations
(or maps made by Alice) δxε . They encode the approximate (theorem 3.1) and
exact (theorem 3.3) differential AND algebraic structure of the tangent bundle
of X . Moreover, if Alice feels the need to differentiate, then again she uses the
maps she has (dilations) to rescale the function she wants to differentiate (see
[10] for a graphical, but not geometrical, interpretation of this formalism by
using braids diagrams).
4 Discussion
The metaphor of the universal front end. Maybe biology uses at a dif-
ferent scale an embodiment of a fundamental mechanism of the nature. Indeed,
I suggest that the physical space can be understood, at some very fundamen-
tal level, as the input of a ”universal front end”, and physical observers are
”universal front ends”.
Then, as suggested in [10], physical observers are like universal front ends
looking at the same (but otherwise unknown) space. This is compatible with
the main statement of the paper, which then suggests that there might be an
analogy between the problem of ”local sign” in neuroscience and the problem
of understanding the properties of the physical space as emerging from some
non-geometrical, more fundamental structure, like a net, a foam, a graph...
I see no obstacle for giving the same treatment to abstract mathematics.
We may imagine that there is an abstract mathematical ”front end” which, if
fed with the definition of a ”space”, then spews out a ”data structure” which
is used for ”past processing”, that is for mathematical reasoning in that space.
(In fact, when we say ”let M be a manifold”, for example, we don’t ”have” that
manifold, only some properties of it, together with some very general abstract
nonsense concerning ”legal” manipulations in the universe of ”manifolds”. All
these can be liken with the image that we get past the ”front end” , in the sense
that, like a real perceived image, we see it all, but we are incapable of really
enumerating and naming all that we see.)
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Alice communicates with Bob. Now Alice wants to send Bob her knowl-
edge. Bob lives in the metric space (Y,D), which was well explored previously,
therefore himself knows well the differential geometry and calculus in the space
Y .
Based on Alice’s informations, Bob hopes to construct a Lipschitz function
from an open set in X with image an open set in Y . If he succeeds, then he
will know all that Alice knows (by transport of all relevant structure using his
Lipschitz function). But he might fail, because of a strong mathematical result
(unknown apparently to physicists, apparently aware only about the dichotomy
discrete/continuous). Indeed, as a consequence of Rademacher theorem (see
Pansu [23], for a Rademacher theorem for Lipschitz function between Carnot
groups, a type of conical groups), if such a function would exist then it would be
differentiable almost everywhere. Or, the differential (at a point) is a morphism
of conical groups which commutes with Alice’s and Bob’s maps (their respective
dilations). Or, it might happen that there is no non-trivial such morphism and
we arrrive at a contradiction! For example, it is known that there is no Lipschitz
embedding of an open set in Heisenberg group with its Carnot-Carathe´odory
distance into the Hilbert space. So, if Alice explored the Heisenberg group and
if Bob expects to understand in Hilbert space, or even in L1, what Alice saw,
then it fails (in the sense explained previously). See for this [13] and references
therein.
This is not a matter of topology (continuous or discrete, or complex topo-
logical features at all scales), but a matter having to do with the construction of
the ”realities” (in the sense of relation (3.0.8), having all to do with differential
calculus and differential geometry in the most fundamental sense.
Therefore, another strategy of Alice would be to communicate to Bob not all
details of her map, but the relevant algebraic identities that her maps (dilations)
satisfy. Then Bob may try to simulate what Alice saw. This is a path first
suggested in [10].
5 Explanation of the title, according to Plato,
Timaeus
”But the race of birds was created out of innocent light-minded men, who,
although their minds were directed toward heaven, imagined, in their simplicity,
that the clearest demonstration of the things above was to be obtained by
sight; these were remodelled and transformed into birds, and they grew feathers
instead of hair.” (source [1])
6 Appendix 1: Plato, Timaeus
The ancient greeks understanding of vision can be inferred from the dialogue
Timaeus, by Plato. Here are some excerpts, where this is explained in a concise
manner (source [1]).
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Timaeus, 12: ”First, then, the gods, imitating the spherical shape of the
universe, enclosed the two divine courses in a spherical body, that, namely,
which we now term the head, being the most divine part of us and the lord of
all that is in us...”
”And of the organs they first contrived the eyes to give light, and the prin-
ciple according to which they were inserted was as follows: So much of fire as
would not burn, but gave a gentle light, they formed into a substance akin to the
light of every-day life; and the pure fire which is within us and related thereto
they made to flow through the eyes in a stream smooth and dense, compressing
the whole eye, and especially the centre part, so that it kept out everything of
a coarser nature, and allowed to pass only this pure element.”
”And the whole stream of vision, being similarly affected in virtue of simi-
larity, diffuses the motions of what it touches or what touches it over the whole
body, until they reach the soul, causing that perception which we call sight.”
”And now there is no longer any difficulty in understanding the creation of
images in mirrors and all smooth and bright surfaces. For from the communion
of the internal and external fires, and again from the union of them and their
numerous transformations when they meet in the mirror, all these appearances
of necessity arise, when the fire from the face coalesces with the fire from the
eye on the bright and smooth surface. And right appears left and left right,
because the visual rays come into contact with the rays emitted by the object
in a manner contrary to the usual mode of meeting...”
7 Appendix 2: Computations in the front end
visual system as a paradigm
Koenderink, Kappers and van Doorn [22] define the ”front end visual system”
as ”the interface between the light field and those parts of the brain nearest to
the transduction stage”. The authors propose the following characterization of
the front end visual system, section 1 [22]:
1. ”the front end is a ”machine” in the sense of a syntactical transformer;
2. there is no semantics. The front end processes structure;
3. the front end is a deterministic machine; ... all output depends causally
on the (total) input from the immediate past.”
4. ”What is not explicitly encoded by the front end is irretrievably lost. Thus
the front end should be universal (undedicated) and yet should provide
explicit data structures.”
Koenderink et al. propose (some embodiment of differential) geometry as a
model for this activity in the brain, [21], p. 126:
”The brain can organize itself through information obtained via interactions
with the physical world into an embodiment of geometry, it becomes a veritable
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geometry engine [...] many of the better-known brain processes are most easily
understood in terms of differential geometrical calculations running on massively
parallel processor arrays whose nodes can be understood quite directly in terms
of multilinear operators (vectors, tensors, etc). In this view brain processes in
fact are space.”
The front end functions in a massively parallel manner, thus it has to do it
by working with local representations. I cite from the last paragraph of section
1, just before the beginning of sections 1.1 [22].
”In a local representation one can do without extensive (that is spatial, or ge-
ometrical) properties and represent everything in terms of intensive properties.
This obviates the need for explicit geometrical expertise. The local representa-
tion of geometry is the typical tool of differential geometry. ... The columnar
organization of representation in primate visual cortex suggests exactly such a
structure.”
References
[1] The Internet Classics Archive, Timaeus, by Plato, translated by Benjamin
Jowett, available at: http://classics.mit.edu//Plato/timaeus.html
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beta_movement
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cutaneous_rabbit_illusion
[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phi_phenomenon
[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument
[6] M. Buliga, Dilatation structures I. Fundamentals, J. Gen. Lie Theory
Appl., 1 (2007), 2, 65-95.
[7] M. Buliga, Introduction to metric spaces with dilations, (2010),
http://arxiv.org/abs/1007.2362
[8] M. Buliga, Infinitesimal affine geometry of metric spaces endowed with
a dilatation structure , Houston Journal of Math. 36, 1 (2010), 91-136,
http://arxiv.org/abs/0804.0135
[9] M. Buliga, Emergent algebras as generalizations of differentiable algebras,
with applications, (2009), http://arxiv.org/abs/0907.1520
[10] M. Buliga, What is a space? Computations in emergent algebras and the
front end visual system, (2010)
http://arxiv.org/abs/1009.5028
[11] M. Buliga, Braided spaces with dilations and sub-riemannian symmetric
spaces, (2010), http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.5031
11
[12] M. Buliga, Deformations of normed groupoids and differential calculus.
First part, (2009), http://arxiv.org/abs/0911.1300
[13] J. Cheeger, B. Kleiner, Metric differentiation, monotonicity and maps to
L1, http://arxiv.org/abs/0907.3295
[14] A. Connes, Sur la theorie non commutative de l’integration, in: Alge´bres
d’Ope´rateurs, Se´minaire sur les Alge´bres d’Ope´rateurs, Les Plans-sur-Bex,
Suisse, 13-18 mars 1978, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 725, ed. by A. Dold
and B. Eckmann, Springer-Verlag 1079, p. 19-143
[15] D.C. Dennett, (1991) Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown
[16] D.C. Dennett, M. Kinsbourne. ”Time and the Observer: the Where and
When of Consciousness in the Brain”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences (15):
183247, (1992)
[17] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_Drafts_Model
[18] D. Deutsch, Quantum theory as a universal physical theory, Int. J. Theor.
Phys. 24, 1-41 (1985)
[19] H. Everett, Theory of the Universal Wavefunction, Thesis, Princeton Uni-
versity, (1956, 1973), pp 1-140
[20] N. Franceschini, J.M. Pichon, C. Blanes, From insect vision to robot vision,
Phil. Trans.: Biological Sciences, 337, 1281 (1992), Natural and Artificial
Low-Level Seeing Systems, 283-294
[21] J. Koenderink, The brain a geometry engine, Psychol. Res. 52 (1990), 122-
127
[22] J.. Koenderink, A. Kappers, A. van Doorn, Local Operations :The Embod-
iment of Geometry. Basic Research Series, (1992), 1-23
[23] P. Pansu, Me´triques de Carnot-Carathe´odory et quasi-isome´tries des es-
paces syme´triques de rang un, Ann. of Math., (2) 129, (1989), 1-60
[24] H.P. Stapp, The basis problem in many-worlds theories, Can. J. Phys.
80(9), 10431052 (2002)
12
